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1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE PROSECUTING 
AUTHORITY IN NAMIBIA 
When south Africa took over the administration of south west Africa 
in 1918, the prevailing south African common law was made applicable in 
south west Africa. From then on the greatest majority of south African 
acts were also made applicable to south west Africa. 1n 1919 south Africa 
established the High court of south west Africa as the judicial authority for 
the territory, with the Appellate Division of the supreme court of south 
Africa as the final court of Appeal. <Carpenter: 1991, p.23>. 
Prior to the formation of the union of south Africa, the prosecution 
authority, at least in Transvaal, vested absolutely in the Attorney-General. 
<Gilling/lam v Attorney-General and Otllers1909 TS 572 on 573>. 
With the formation of the union of south Africa, section 139 of the 
south Africa Act of 1909 confirmed the independence of the prosecuting 
authorities. 
Prosecutions in south west Africa were in the hands of the Attorney-
General of south west Africa. Like his south African counterpart, the south 
west African Attorney-General was independent and free from political 
oversight. The Administrator of south west Africa issued Proclamation 5 of 
1918 to make the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act of 1917 effective in 
the Protectorate of south west Africa, with minor special conditions. 
The Administrator's Proclamation 20 of 1919 repealed Proclamation 
5 of 1918, but confirmed the independence of the Attorney-General. only 
the title was changed to crown Prosecutor. 
Thus, initially the prosecuting authorities both in south Africa and 
south west Africa had absolute autonomy and were free from political 
control. However, in 1926 the ways parted. The south African Criminal and 
Magistrates· courts Procedure Amendment Act 39of1926 amended section 
139 of the south Africa Act and sections 7<1> and <2> of the Criminal 
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Procedure and Evidence Act of 1917. sections 1<3> and <4> placed the 
Attorney-Generals under the control and directions of the minister. 
The 1926 Act was not made applicable in south west Africa and the 
Attorney-General of south west remained independent and free of 
political control. In 1935 Proclamation 30 of 1935 maintained the 
independence of the Prosecutor-General. The criminal Procedure 
Ordinance, Ordinance 34 of 1963 repealed Proclamation 30 of 1935. Still, 
the south west African legislation did not follow the south African 
example of its time, but maintained the independence of the Attorney-
General. 
In south Africa the trend of political control was firmly established 
by the General Law Amendment Act, Act 46 of 1935. The prosecuting 
authority became part of the authority and power of the minister of 
justice. The minister had the legal right to take over the role of the 
Attorney-General and solicitor-generals at his own discretion. The 1935 
formulation found its way into the Criminal Procedure Act of 1955, which 
repealed Act 31 of 1917. 
The consequence of all these developments was that the authority 
and power of the Attorney-General in south west Africa was much wider 
than those of his counterparts in south Africa. 
on 22 July 1977 the Attorney-General of the territory lost his 
autonomy when the new Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 <CPA>, was 
made applicable in south west Africa. section 3<5> of the said Act made 
political control mandatory: 
m The state President shall, subject to the laws relating to 
the public service, appoint in respect of the area of 
jurisdiction of each provincial division an Attornev-
ceneral, who, on behalf of the state and subject to the 
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provisions of this Act -
raJ shall nave authority to prosecute, in tne name of 
the Republic in criminal proceedings in any court 
in tne area in respect of which ne nas been 
appointed, any person in respect of any offence in 
regard to which any court in tne said area nas 
jurisdiction; and 
WJ may perform all functions relating to the 
exercise of such authority. 
r21 The authority conferred upon an Attorney-General 
under subsection r11 shall include the autnoritv to 
prosecute in any court any appeal arising from any 
criminal proceedings within the area of jurisdiction of 
tne Attorney-General concerned. 
r3J The Minister may, subject to tne laws relating to tne 
public service, in respect of each area for which an 
Attorney-General nas been appointed, appoint one or 
more deputy attorneys-general, wno may, subject to 
the control and directions of tne Attorney-General 
concerned, do anything which may lawfully be done by 
the Attorney-General. 
(4J Whenever it becomes necessary that an acting 
Attorney-General be appointed, the Minister may 
appoint any competent officer in tne public service to 
act as Attorney-General for the period for which such 
appointment may be necessary. 
rsJ An Attorney-General shall exercise his authority and 
perform his functions under this Act or under any other 
law subject to the control and directions of the Minister, 
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who may reverse any decision arrived at by an Attorney-
ceneral and may himself in general or in any specific 
matter exercise any part of such authority and perform 
any of such functions. 
Thus, from 22July1977 the Attorney-General of south west Africa was 
in the same subservient position as his/her south African counterparts. 
Although the political and constitutional integrity of south west Africa was 
hardly respected by the consecutive south African governments, the south 
African legislature acknowledged the integrity of the prosecuting authority 
until 1977. 
The philosophy underlying the previous distinction between south 
Africa and south west Africa was based on the fact that south west Africa 
had not been part of south Africa. As a Mandate c territory a south African 
minister could not control the Attorney-General. With the Criminal 
Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977, south west Africa was stripped of this last 
bastion of judicial independence. 
The timing of the implementation of political control over the south 
west African Attorney-General is not without significance. The south 
African-backed Turnhalle conference of 1977 did not lead to an 
internationally accepted independence without swapo. International 
pressure was mounting against south Africa and only a year later, in 1978, 
the united Nations accepted Resolution 435, providing for united Nations 
supervised elections which would lead to an independent Namibia. 
Acting supreme court of Namibia Judge Leon made the following 
observation regarding the implementation of section 3 of Act 51 of 1977 in 
Namibia: 
It was made applicable by an apartheid government 
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bent on domination, no doubt determined to enforce its 
political will on the independence of the prosecuting 
authority in south west Africa. I cannot for one moment 
believe that that would be in accordance with the ethos of 
the Namibian people. 
<Ex Parte Attorney-General in re The constitutional 
Relationship Between The Attorney-General And The 
Prosecutor-General, p 36 f .> 
In the same tone Henning, sc and Badenhorst, counsel for the 
Prosecutor-General, pointed out that the government who implemented 
section 3 of the CPA was not a Rechtsstaat and the political control over the 
prosecuting authority not a crundnorm of a constitutional dispensation. 
(1993: p.95) 
In the period following the implementation of political authority and 
control from south Africa over the south west African Attorney-General, 
the Minister of Justice did not hesitate to use his authority when he 
deemed it necessary. It is clear from this Act and other Proclamations issued 
by the Administrator-General, and from south African laws made applicable 
in the Territory of south west Africa, that the control of the prosecuting 
mechanisms was of growing importance to the south African government. 
When the power of the Minister of Justice over the Attorney-General 
was not adequate to manipulate prosecutions in the Territory, the south 
African authorities used other laws. A case in point is the well-known brutal 
murder of swapo activist Immanuel Shifidi. 
Shifidi was killed by five members of the south African Defence Force 
at a political rally in Windhoek. The Attorney-General for south west Africa 
instituted criminal proceedings. However, section 103 ter (4> of the Defence 
Act of 1957 provided the state President with the authority to issue a 
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certificate to stop any prosecution against defence force members for acts 
committed in the operational area. The state President, acting on the 
recommendation of the Minister of Defence, issued a certificate in terms 
of section 103 ter <4>. The Administrator-General of south west Africa 
thereafter issued a certificate to halt the prosecution. 
The son of the deceased applied for a court order declaring the 
Administrator-General's certificate invalid <Shilidi v Administrator-General 
For south west Alrica 1989 <4> SA 631 <SWA>. 
In the case of Shifidi no operational action of the Defence Force was 
involved and the killing took place on a football field in Windhoek. The 
court held that neither the Minister of Defence nor the state President, nor 
anyone else, had a discretion to decide where an operational area was 
located for the purpose of section 103 ter. In this case it could not be said 
objectively that a football field in Windhoek was part of the operational 
area. Thus, the application was granted. 
To overcome the shortcomings of the certificate, the Administrator-
General issued a proclamation, declaring Windhoek part of the operational 
area. 
2. NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE AND THE NEW CONSTITUTION 
2.1 THE INFLUENCE OF THE NEW DISPENSATION ON THE COURTS' 
APPROACH OF CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
The independence of Namibia on 21 March 1990 gave the country a 
constitutional dispensation and a totally new approach towards the legal 
system. By opting for a Bill of Rights as an integral part of the constitution 
of the Republic of Namibia, the constituent Assembly opted for a legal 
system based on values and principles as opposed to the south African 
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system of parliamentary sovereignty. 
From the outset the High and supreme courts of an independent 
Namibia adopted an approach to the interpretation of constitutional issues 
which was in line with the letter and spirit of the new constitutional order. 
lSee Namibia National student1s organisation and Others v speaker oF 
the National Assembly For south west Alrica 1990 <1> SA 617 SWA, 
Mwandlngi versusMinisteroFDelence1 Namibla1991 <1> SA851 <NM>J. 
In EX parte Attorney-General, Namibia: in re corporal 
Punishment by organs 01 state 1991 rsJ SA 76 fNmSCJ, the court was 
confronted with the question if corporal punishment by an organ of the 
State is in conflict with chapter 3 of the constitution, more particularly art 
8 thereof. 
unlike earlier cases lsuch as cabinet For the Territory oF south west 
Africa v Chikane 1990 <1> SA 349 <A>J ,the court did not begin with the 
facts of the case, but the context of the constitution. The constitution and 
its texts, the court states, must be interpreted in the light of the 
aspirations and values of the new nation that the constitution seeks to 
articulate. The court made the following comment on the constitution: 
It expresses tne commitment of tne Namibian people to tne 
creation of a democratic society based on respect for numan 
dignity, protection of liberty and the rule of law. Practices and 
values which are inconsistent with or which might subvert this 
commitment are vigorously rejected. 
For this reason colonialism as well as "the practices and 
ideology of apartheid from which tne majority of tne people of 
Namibia nave suffered for so long", is firmly rejected. 
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Kruger makes the following observation regarding this judgement: 
There can be no doubt that the approach followed by tne 
court may be described as tne sui generis approach referred 
to in Fischer supra, and in particular as a value-orientated 
approach. <Emphasis mine, jnh> <ibid: p.113> 
The change in the Namibian society that came about by independence did 
not, as we have seen, stop with the implementation of a constitution 
which has a Bill of Rights. The new dispensation was also marked by a new 
approach in the interpretation of human rights and other constitutional 
issues. 
2.2 THE COURTS AND THE EXISTINO LAWS 
Before turning to the constitutional position of the prosecuting authority 
in the new Namibia, we need to look at the position of existing laws. 
Articles 140 <1> and <3> of the Namibian constitution provides as follows: 
Article 140 lThe Law in Force at the Date of 
lndependencel 
r1J Subject to tne provisions of this constitution, all laws which 
were in force immediately before the date of Independence 
shall remain in force until repealed or amended by Act of 
Parliament or until they are declared unconstitutional by a 
competent court. 
f3J Anything done under such laws prior to the date of 
Independence by the Government, or by a Minister or otner 
official of the Republic of south Africa shall be deemed to nave 
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been done by tne Government of tne Republic of Namibia or by 
a corresponding Minister or official of tne Government of tne 
Republic of Namibia, unless such action is subsequently 
repudiated by an Act of Parliament, and anything so done by 
tne Government service commission snail be deemed to nave 
been done by tne Public service commission referred to in 
Article 112, unless it is determined otherwise by an Act of 
Parliament. 
The effect of this article was tested in the so-called cultura 2000 
case <Oovernment of the Republic of Namibia versus Cultura 2000, 
1994<1> SA 407 NmSc>. Before independence the then representative 
authority for whites sold the farm Regenstein to the organisation 
cultura 2000. The representative authority also donated R4 million to 
cu1tura 2000 and gave it a loan of R4 million carrying interest at 1%. Three 
weeks before independence the Administrator-General converted the loan 
into an outright donation. 
In 1991 the Namibian legislator promulgated the state Repudiation 
<Cultura 20001 Act, to nullify the above actions of the old second tier 
government for whites. The High court of Namibia declared the Act 
unconstitutional since it concluded that Art. 140 <3> only applies to acts 
and actions of the previous government that were not completed. 
on appeal the supreme court found that nothing in Article 140 <1> or 
<3> prevents the Namibian government to repudiate any act or action of 
the previous government. 
3 THE NEW DISPENSATION 
The Namibian constitution introduced a new dispensation where the 
prosecuting authority is placed in the hand of a new office, the 
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Prosecutor-General <Article 88>. Article 140 <2> states that any reference to 
the Attorney-General in legislation in force immediately prior to the date 
of Independence shall be deemed to be a reference to the Prosecutor-
General, who shall exercise his or her functions in accordance with this 
constitution. 
However, it is not merely a change of name that was effected by the 
constitution. The constitution also makes provision for an Attorney-
General <Articles 86 and 87>. The Attorney-General follows the general 
pattern of Britain and wales and several commonwealth countries. The 
Attorney-General is a political appointment, exercises the final 
responsibility for the office of the prosecuting authority and is the 
principal legal adviser of the government. The Namibian Attorney-General 
is also responsible for the protection and upholding of the constitution 
lArticle 87 C3>1. But the Namibian Attorney-General is all but a carbon copy 
of his/her British counterpart, as the later conflicts between the Attorney-
General and the Prosecutor-General clearly demonstrated. 
There is also a difference between the appointment of the 
Prosecutor-General and the Attorney-General. The Attorney-General is 
appointed by the President in accordance with the provisions of Article 32. 
<Article 86>. Article 32 <3> <1> provides for the appointment of 
aaJ the Prime Minister; 
bbJ Ministers and Deputy-Ministers; 
ccJ the Attorney-Genera/; 
ddJ the Director-General of Planning; and 
eeJ any other person or persons who are required by any other 
provision of this constitution or any other law to be 
appointed by the President. 
Thus, although the constitution nowhere states that the Attorney-
General is part of the Cabinet, his/her appointment is provided for in the 
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same article as that of members of cabinet. 
The Prosecutor-General, however is appointed by the President on 
the recommendation of the Judicial service commission. [Article 88 <1>1. 
Other offices appointed in the same way are: 
ca> judges [Article 82<1n, and 
Cb> the Ombudsman lArticle 90 <1>1. 
From the above it is clear that the Prosecutor-General is a quasi-
judicial appointment, while the Attorney-General is a political 
appointment. By creating the two posts, the fathers of the Namibian 
constitution already made a distinction between the political official and 
the Prosecutor-General as a person free from direct political influence. 
4 THE HISTORICAL BACKCROUND OF THE NEW POSTS 
From the debates in the constituent Assembly it is not clear where 
the idea of the new Attorney-General and Prosecutor-General came from, 
except that some of the constitutional fathers had the British and other 
commonwealth systems in mind. Thus or. N. Tjiriange, who later to 
became the Minister of Justice in the first cabinet of the Republic of 
Namibia, said the following about the relationship between the 
Prosecutor-General and Attorney-General in the commonwealth: 
Traditionally under the system of commonwealth countries the 
prosecutor-general is within the Office of the Attorney-General 
for subordination reasons, but when he does his work, he is 
independent. <Constituent Assembly Minutes: 1990, p. 154> 
In the same vein the late or. Fanuel Kozonguizi, who became the first 
ombudsman after independence, compares the Namibian constitution on 
this point with the English system. 
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For example, in tne British system they nave an Attorney-
General wno is a political appointment but wno nas the 
functions of initiating prosecutions. Not only is there an 
Attorney-General, but you also nave a solicitor General under 
him wno is also a political appointment and wno is supposed 
to be his assistant. Then comes under them the Director of 
Public Prosecutions, wno is in charge of the actual prosecution 
of people. He advises the Attorney-General, but the Attorney-
General is the one who decides whether to prosecute or not 
and the Director of Prosecutions is the one wno actually does 
the work. Clbid: p. 155> 
When we discuss the later conflict between the Prosecutor-General 
and the Attorney-General, it will be clear that Dr. Tjiriange completely 
over-simplified the commonwealth systems. The truth is that most of the 
commonwealth countries use the terms Attorney-General and Director of 
Public Prosecutions. vet, there are several different models that varies 
from an independent Director of Public Prosecutions responsible for 
prosecutions, to a political appointed Attorney-General responsible for 
prosecutions, to a minister of justice taking the final decisions. 
Likewise, the interpretation that Dr. Kozonguizi gave of the British 
system <possibly a reference to prosecuting in England and wales> is not 
correct <see EX parte Attorney-General in re The constitutional 
Relationship Between The Attorney-General And The Prosecutor-
General, p. 30>. Suffice it to say that the constitutional Fathers and 
Mothers did not follow a specific model to base the new positions of 
Attorney-General and Prosecutor-General on. They took cognisance of the 
English system as well as the commonwealth systems, without following 
anyone in detail. 
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The constituent Assembly did, however, attempt to lay down certain 
important principles. Thus, Mr. Dirk Mudge, an elected member of the 
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, commented during the debate that it 
would be unacceptable to give the responsibility to prosecute and defend 
appeals in criminal proceedings to a political appointee such as the 
Attorney-General. c constituent Assembly Minutes: 1990, p. 153> 
This position was supported by or. Tjiriange, as well as Mr. Vekuii 
Rukoro, who became Deputy-Minister of Justice in the first cabinet and 
Attorney-General in the second. <ibid: p.153> The only dissenting voice in 
the constituent Assembly was Mr. Nahas Angula of swapo, later Minister of 
Education in the first cabinet, who did not think that the fact that a 
person is a political appointee will affect his/her independence. vet, he did 
not have a problem with a political Attorney-General and a Prosecutor-
General, who for sure must be a civil servant in the true tradition of that 
profession. Mr. Angula did not propose an amendment and his opinion did 
not reflect further in the debates or in the drafts laid before the 
constituent Assembly. <ibid: p153 fJ 
The debates reflects little insight in the issues that would later arise, 
i.e. the relationship between the Attorney-General and the Prosecutor-
General, and the question as to exactly what are the prerequisites for an 
independent Prosecutor-General. 
The members of the constituent Assembly were unanimous in their 
view that the prosecutor-general should be a civil servant. This view was 
undoubtedly influenced by the practice in England and Wales and other 
commonwealth jurisdictions. <cf. The contributions of the members 
Tjiriange and Kozonguizi above>. 
The fact that civil servants are vulnerable, especially when they are 
to be subordinated to high ranking political officials, like an Attorney-
General, did not enter the minds of the constituent Assembly. 
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Members Tjiriange and Kozonguizi took it for granted that the 
Prosecutor-General will be subordinated to the Attorney-General or the 
Minister of Justice. For the Assembly the problem seems to have been 
where the Prosecutor-General will fit into the structure and under whose 
authority would he work, the Minister of Justice or the Attorney-General. 
or. Tjiriange seems to have understood that if the Attorney-General 
does not take the final decisions, the Prosecutor-General cannot be 
subordinate to him. 
Now that we nave done that rtaken the Prosecutor-General 
out under the final authority of the Attorney-General -jnhJ, tne 
subordination nas been removed, ne (Prosecutor-General -jnhJ 
is removed from the office of tne Attorney-General. To wnom 
is our new man subordinated? <ibid: p.157> 
The discussions on the Attorney-General was suspended after Mr. 
Kozunguizi has suggested that the Prosecutor-General should be 
accountable to the Minister of Justice. After the lawyers in the House had 
discussed the matter with the legal advisers of the different parties, they 
returned with a new draft on the responsibilities Of the Attorney-General, 
which began with the present Article 87<1>: 
The Attorney-Genera/ exercises the final responsibility for the 
office of the Prosecutor-General. 
For the constituent Assembly the problem was solved. The 
Prosecutor-General is independent, but accountable to the Attorney-
General. Exactly what the final responsibility amounts to and how that 
responsibility was to be exercised, was never discussed. 
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Another aspect that the constituent Assembly did not address, was 
the exact role of the Ministry of Justice vis-a-vis the Offices of the 
Attorney-General and Prosecutor-General. The Ministry is not mentioned 
in the constitution at all. The constitution also guarantees the 
independence of the judiciary. In this respect it does not distinguish 
between judges and magistrates. 
The only reason for a Ministry of Justice was the south African 
structure that was in operation in Namibia at the time of independence. 
Had it not been for the south African model, the first government could 
not have created the Ministry by merely following the constitution. 
However, the Ministry took financial and administrative 
responsibility for the Office of the Prosecutor-General [despite Article 
87<1H, the magistrates <who, one would expect, as part of the independent 
judiciary, should have fallen under the Chief Justice and should thus be 
appointed by the Judicial service commission with the same guarantees 
as judges>, the legal drafters, the Law commission <who would smoothly 
have fitted into the office of the Attorney-General as chief legal advisor of 
the government>, the independent office of the Ombudsman, Legal Aid 
and the administrative staff of the courts. <Annual Report of the 
Permanent secretary of Justice, 1997>. 
In 2000 the Legal Office SADCC, which will be seated in Windhoek, will 
also fall under the Ministry. The Ministry of Justice takes budgetary 
responsibility for all these components. In all other aspects the Attorney-
General deals with the Office of the Prosecutor-General as part of his 
portfolio. <Annual Report of the Attorney-General 1997>. 
For the purpose of this study, the undefined relationships of the 
different components <Minister of Justice, Attorney-General and 
Prosecutor-General> are important. Almost ten years after independence 
there is still no complementary legislation to streamline the undefined 
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aspects of the constitution. 
In 1997 the Attorney-General drafted legislation to bring the 
Prosecutor-General, the legal drafters and the Law commission under his 
administrative control. The legislation never went past cabinet and 
reasons were not made known. It is probably safe to assume that the 
reasons were mainly political. 
5 THE APPOINTMENT OF THE PROSECUTOR-CENERAL 
The Prosecutor-General is appointed by the President upon 
recommendation of the Judicial service commission. The convention that 
the President follows the recommendation of the Judicial service 
commission, is settled Namibian practice. 
In 1997, after the death of the first Ombudsman, the President 
appointed the then acting Ombudsman, Adv. E.K. Kasutu, as Ombudsman 
without waiting for a recommendation from the Judicial service 
commission. After a massive uproar from both the public and the judicial 
profession, the President withdrew the appointment and later appointed 
Adv. Bience Gawannas at the recommendation of the Judicial service 
commission. 
In jurisdictions where the body that appoints the head of 
prosecutions can be manipulated by politicians, be it the executive or 
legislative powers, the Office may still be independent, but the office 
bearer can easily be compromised by his "masters" who gave him the 
post. 
According to Article 85 of the constitution the Judicial service 
commission, responsible for the appointment of the Prosecutor-General, 
shall consist of the Chief justice, a judge appointed by the President, the 
Attorney-General and two representatives from the legal profession. The 
only political figure on the Judicial service commission is the Attorney-
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General. Any political manoeuvring will be extremely difficult, especially 
since the representatives from the profession are nominated by two 
different organisations, the Law society and the Lawyers Association of 
Namibia. 
Thus, unlike south Africa, where the majority of the members of the 
Judicial service commission are appointed by Parliament, it will be 
extremely difficult to manipulate the Judicial service commission in 
Namibia. If the majority party in south Africa has an overwhelming 
majority, the chances are good that the appointments of the committee 
will have a political bias. This is highly unlikely in Namibia. 
6 INDEPENDENCE: CHANGES AND CHALLENGES 
For the Office of the Prosecutor-General independence on 21 March 
1990 brought drastic changes. The last 'prosecutor' Attorney-General of the 
old dispensation and his most senior deputy left Namibia Quietly for their 
motherland, south Africa. 
The acting Prosecutor-General got on the wrong side of the new 
constitutional era in The state versus Acheson 1991<2> SA sos NHC 
shortly after independence. In this case the accused, Donald Acheson, was 
before court for killing swapo activist and a prominent member of the 
party's election machinery, Adv. Anton Lubowski. The honourable Justice 
Mahomed, later to become the second chief justice of Namibia, was on the 
bench. 
Politically tension was building up between the new state and its 
former sovereign power, south Africa. There was strong evidence that 
two members of the Civil co-operation Bureau, a covert organisation of 
the south African Defence Force, Staal Burger and Chappie Maree, were at 
least accessories to the killing. It was almost impossible to get them 
extradited from south Africa cas was the case with the so-called outjo 
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Three, a German citizen, Horst Kientz, and two right wing south Africans, 
oarryll stopforth and Leonard veenendal, who were suspected of killing 
two Namibians>. 
vet the court refused the state a further postponement. Even in 
politically sensitive cases where the former colonial power was involved, 
the court still expected of the state to abide with the standards of the Bill 
Of Rights. 
The biggest challenge for the newly established Office of the 
Prosecutor-General came from the equally new office of the Attorney-
General. unlike the powerful south African Minister of Justice, the 
Attorney-General was not 1 800 km away, but only a few blocks away in a 
building next to Parliament. 
It was from the outset clear that the then Attorney-General saw the 
office of the Prosecutor-General merely as an extension of his own. The 
Attorney-General relied on the controversial section 3<5> of the Criminal 
Procedure Act to vindicate his position, thus claiming extensive 
administrative and supervisory power over the Prosecutor-General 
The effect of the latter sub-section a.e. 3(5J of the criminal 
Procedure Act-jnhJ is unequivocally to bestow upon the then 
Minister ultimate control over the Attorney-General in respect 
of his prosecutorial functions. This was accordingly the position 
at the stage when independence was declared in Namibia. 
<Henning and Badenhorst: 1994, p.11> 
consequently, the Attorney-General concluded that 'final 
responsibility' must inevitably carry with it associated commensurate 
power of intervention and direction. csoggott and coetzee: 1993, p. 14> The 
extent of the Attorney-General's interpretation becomes clear from his 
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actions: 
The Attorney-General and two of his senior staff members gave 
instructions to members of the office of the Prosecutor-
General without his knowledge and without consulting him; 
the Attorney-General required members of the Office of the 
Prosecutor-General to perform tasks unconnected with the 
office rone senior member served on three commissions of 
inquiry on behalf of the Ministry of Home AffairsJ; 
the Attorney-General appointed a member of the staff of the 
office of the Prosecutor-General as a special investigator 
without prior discussion with the Prosecutor-General rwhich 
the Prosecutor-General considered undesirable since it could 
lead to the prosecutor becoming a witnessJ; 
the Attorney-General sent up to five letters on one day to the 
Prosecutor-General; 
the Prosecutor-Genera/ had to attend weekly meetings at the 
Attorney-General's office where the chairperson demanded 
explanations regarding pending prosecutions; 
the Attorney-General instructed the Prosecutor-General to 
remand cases where all the witnesses were present at the 
court ran instruction the Prosecutor-General refused to obeyJ; 
the Attorney-General dealt directly with enquiries and 
expected the Prosecutor-General to keep him informed rather 
than referring the enquiries direct/V to the Prosecutor-General; 
and 
the Attorney-General demanded access to police dockets 
rwhich the Prosecutor-General considered to be privileged -
that was before the courts forced the Prosecutor-General to 
disclose the content of dockets>; 
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and 
the Attorney-General gave the Prosecutor-General instructions 
to withdraw a case. <Prosecutor-General's Letter: 27 March 
1992 to the secretary of the Judicial service commission, 
quoted in Henning and Badenhorst: 1994, p. 119 ff.> 
From the above it is clear that despite the emphasis that the 
constituent Assembly placed on the independence of the Prosecutor-
General, in practice he was more subservient than any other time in 
Namibian legal history. 
The new Attorney-General attempted to control almost every facet 
of the responsibilities and administration of the Prosecutor-General's 
office. He intervened and controlled in a way that no south African 
Minister of Justice with all his legal powers ever attempted. When the 
Prosecutor-General refused to take orders from the Attorney-General, the 
latter laid a charge of insubordination with the Judicial service 
commission. <Henning and Badenhorst: 1994, p. 119>. 
From this historical perspective it is clear that the conflict between 
the Attorney-General and the Prosecutor-General was not merely 
transitional problems, nor was it a conflict between dissenting ideological 
or political thinkers.1 At stake was nothing less than the independence of 
the Prosecutor-General, which was an integral part of the new 
constitutional dispensation in Namibia. 
The office of the Prosecutor-General is an integral part of the 
practice of the administration of justice. This sphere of the 
The Attorney-General was one of a young generation German-speaking Namibians who 
were part of the internal wing of swapo during the pre-independence era. The 
Prosecutor-General was a deputy-Attorney-General during the same period. Although he 
was not a member of the Broederbond or involved with the political powers, he was 
perceived to be part of the old order. 
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state is constitutionally separated and independent. 
Interference by the Executive - through the Attorney-General -
into this domain would be unconstitutional in the legality 
sense but would furthermore constitute a serious violation of 
the content of fundamental underlying concepts such as 
Grundnorm, Rechtsstaat and constitutionalism. This would 
present a threat against the fundamental constitutional order, 
which cannot be tolerated and should be avoided. < Henning 
and Badenhorst: 1994, p. 132.> 
7 THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE PROSECUTOR-GENERAL: THE CHALLENGE 
IN PRACTICE 
7 .1 Background to the conflict 
constitutional watchers were generally impressed with the Namibian 
constitution. several of them commended the independence of the 
Prosecutor-General. Professor Gerhard Erasmus <1990, p. 308> pointed out 
that the Prosecutor-General is not only considerably more independent 
than the Attorney-General of the south African period, but he/she is solely 
responsible for decisions concerning criminal proceedings. Neither the 
Attorney-General and even less the Minister of Justice can give instructions 
to the Prosecutor-General. 
Others have pointed to the fact that prerogatives do not exist in the 
Namibian constitution. state functionaries <even the President> can only 
exercise those functions given to him/her by the constitution. <Carpenter: 
1991, p. 22, Erasmus: 1991 p. 96. see also Edwards: 1977, p. 6> 
The fact that the independence of the Prosecutor-General in the 
constitution received such a good southern African and international 
press was a strong encouragement for the Prosecutor-General to stand his 
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ground. 
The fact that the two positions vaguely conformed to the 
differentiation of the posts in England and wales and the commonwealth, 
without the specific boundaries of the two positions being spelled out, 
resulted in two conflicting interpretations by the Attorney-General and 
the Prosecutor-General. 
The conflict was eventually settled by the supreme court. [EX Parte 
Attorney-General in re The constitutional Relationship Between The 
Attorney-Qeneral And The Prosecutor-Genera~ NSC, heard on 
S.10.1994 and 6.12.1994, delivered on 1S.07.1995. original copy oF 
the Registrar used rcase No SA 7/9SA 
In a drawn-out case of Racial Discrimination against the public 
broadcaster, the Namibian Broadcasting corporation <NBC>, c The state 
versus Gorelick and others, Windhoek Magistrates court, 199~1 the 
conflict came to a point. 
on 1 July 1993 the Attorney-General requested the police docket 
from the Prosecutor-General <Henning and Badenhorst: 1994, p.126>. The 
Prosecutor-General refused since he regarded the docket as part of the 
prosecutor's brief and privileged <that was before the state was forced to 
disclose the police docket before a trial>. 
Later the Prosecutor-General changed his mind and on 20 August 
1993 forwarded the docket to the Attorney-General. <ibid:p.126> on the 
same day the Attorney-General informed the Prosecutor-General that he 
had decided that prosecution should be withdrawn. He then instructed 
the Prosecutor-General to inform the court and counsel for the defendant. 
<ibid: p. 127). 
1 The case was of great political interest. While the Act was introduced in Namibia against 
the background of a century of white colonial rule, in an ironic twist of circumstances in 
this first significant test of the Act, the complainant was a white police officer, 
complaining about what he perceived as racial hate speech by the national broadcaster. 
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The Prosecutor-General informed the Attorney-General on the same 
day that he did not regard himself bound by the instruction. <ibid: p.128>. 
The Prosecutor-General instructed the local prosecutor to request the 
court to proceed with the matter, whereupon the Attorney-General 
requested for a postponement of the case pending a decision of the 
supreme court on the constitutional relationship between the Prosecutor-
General and the Attorney-General and the status of their offices. The 
matter came before a full Bench of the High court <Attorney-General of 
Namibia and the Prosecutor-General: Gorelick and others1 case No 
C2/9S.JThe High court granted the postponement. 
Thereupon the Attorney-General brought a petition to the supreme 
court in terms of section 15<1> of the supreme court Act of 1990 to 
determine the following questions: 
Whether the Attorney-General, in pursuance of Article 87 of the 
constitution and in the exercise of the final responsibility for 
the Office of the Prosecutor-General, has the authority: 
m to instruct the Prosecutor-General to institute a 
prosecution, to decline to prosecute or to 
terminate a pending prosecution in any matter; 
riiJ to instruct the Prosecutor-General to take on or to 
take any steps which the Attorney-Genera/ may 
deem desirable in connection with the 
preparation, institution or conduct of any 
prosecution; 
am to require that the Prosecutor-General keeps the 
Attorney-General informed in respect of all 
prosecutions initiated or to be initiated which 
might arouse public interest or involve important 
23 
aspects of legal or prosecutorial policy. 
7.2 The case of the Attornev-ceneral 
The Attorney-General based his case on three points: 
1 He maintained that final responsibility means that the ultimate 
prosecuting discretion or ultimate superintendence vests in the 
Attorney-General. <Soggott and coetzee:: 1993, p. 2 ff.> 
2 The Attorney-General also submitted that section 3<5> of the 
Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977, was still Namibian law and 
that the Prosecutor-General must exercise his authority and 
perform his duties under the Act subject to the control and 
directions of the Attorney-General <as the previous Attorney-
Generals since 1977 did under the control and direction of the 
Minister of Justice>. 
In his main Heads of Argument, the Attorney-General argued 
that section 3<5> of Act 51 of 1977 was still intact, provided that 
wherever the word Attorney-General appears, one should read 
Prosecutor-General <see article 141<2> of the constitution> and 
where the word Minister appears, one should read Attorney-General. 
<Soggott & coetzee: 194, p.10 -11>. 
3 The Attorney-General submitted that article 87<a> accords with the 
situation in the united Kingdom and the commonwealth, where the 
prosecuting authority is generally known as the Director of Public 
Prosecutions and operates under the authority and guidance of the 
Attorney-General. Thus, in Namibia the Prosecutor-General should 
also be submitted to the Attorney-General. The Attorney-General is 
in Namibia, like the commonwealth countries, the final authority in 
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all criminal prosecutions and proceedings. 
According to the Attorney-General, Article 140 c which provides for 
all laws in force immediately before independence to remain in force> and 
Article 141 <which replaces the Prosecutor-General with the Attorney-
General in all existing legislation>, do not enlarge the ambit of the duties 
and responsibilities of the Prosecutor-General vis-a-vis the Attorney-
General of the colonial order. csoggott & coetzee: 1994, p. 11 f.> 
It follows that the constitution leaves undisturbed that aspect of 
the relationship between the Prosecutor-General (formerly the Attorney-
GeneralJ and a Minister or Official corresponding with the then Minister of 
Justice referred to in the Criminal Procedure Act. csoggott & coetzee: 1994, 
p.12>. 
After analysing the words final and responsibility the Attorney-
General concluded that given the dictionary meaning of the words, it is 
clear that the constitution burdens the Attorney-General with ultimate 
responsibility for the Prosecutor-General's office. This burden, he argued, 
cannot be carried out without commensurate power of intervention and 
direction. Cibid: p.13f.> 
The Attorney-General found support for his position in Article 41, 
which makes the Ministers of cabinet responsible and accountable to the 
President and Parliament for their own ministries and collectively for the 
work of Cabinet. Since the constitution does not make provision for any 
structural relationship between the Prosecutor-General and the Minister 
of Justice, or any other minister for that matter, the Attorney-General, as 
a political appointee, is the only constitutional Office that can take final 
responsibility for the Prosecutor-General. <ibid: p. 15> 
The Attorney-General described his function to uphold and protect 
the constitution as a uniquely humanitarian an caring quality of the 
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Namibian constitution. To fulfil this function, the Attorney-General must 
be in a position to determine strategies ... and the implementation of such 
strategies in terms of prosecutorial action. <ibid: p. 16>. 
The Attorney-General finally made a major point of the fact that the 
framers of the constitution modelled the functions of the Attorney-
General on the Westminster model. It seems as if the Attorney-General 
suggested that the English/Welsh model is followed in most 
commonwealth jurisdictions where both the offices of Attorney-General 
and Director of Public Prosecutions are recognized by the constitution. 
<ibid: p. 16 ff.) 
The Attorney-General did not conduct an in-depth study of either 
the English/Welsh model or the commonwealth models as such. While he 
is correct in his historical approach of the relationship between the 
Attorney-General, a political appointee, and the Director of Public 
Prosecutions of England and wales, a barrister or solicitor appointed by 
the Home secretary, he did not go into recent developments in England. 
Suffice it at this stage to say that although the Attorney-General of 
the united Kingdom does indeed have a duty of superintendence <which 
is a strong word>, there has been a strong development of more 
independence for the Director or Public Prosecutions. <See the judgment 
of the supreme court on this point in <S> below.> 
The arguments of the Attorney-General were all based on the 
practical issue of running the two crucial offices. The issue for him is to 
determine how the Attorney-General can exercise his final responsibility 
for the office of the Prosecutor-General. From this basic power-political 
platform he concluded that final responsibility also means final 
control. 
Without questioning the bona fides or credibility of the then 
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Attorney-Genera1,1 it is clear his ideal was an Attorney-General that takes 
control of both the important prosecutorial decisions and the day to day 
administration of the Prosecutor-General's office. While the integrity of 
the Attorney-General cannot be questioned, his wisdom and insight in 
the issues at stake is something different. 1 will return to this issue later. 
7 .3 The Argument of the Prosecutor-ceneral 
While the argument of the Attorney-General was practical, based on 
the perceived international models that featured in the Namibian 
constitution, the Prosecutor-General took a philosophical approach. The 
Prosecutor-General began with a closer look at constitutionalism and the 
Grundnorm of the Namibian law. 
The Prosecutor-General defined constitutional ism to mean that the 
government to be instituted shall be constrained by the constitution and 
shall govern only according to its terms and subject to its 
limitations, only with agreed powers and For agreed purposes. <Bold 
emphasis mine -jnh> <Henning & Badenhorst: 1994, p. 7>. 
The Grundnorm is the concept or norms and values behind the 
constitution. Wiechers refers to it as the unalterable rules that cannot be 
amended by any constitutional revision or change ... lt is said that these 
fundamental laws ensure the foundations on which the constitution rests 
and are therefore immutable. <in Kahn E Ced>: 1985, p. 389 ff., quoted in 
Henning and Badenhorst: 1994, p. 10>. 
I The history of the Colonial misuse of prosecutorial authority undoubtedly inspired the 
Attorney-General to opt for a powerful political Attorney-General, grounded in the human 
rights tradition of the struggle against apartheid vis-a-vis an office who consisted 
predominantly of lawyers who served as prosecutors under the former administration 
with its poor human rights record. Although the language of the Attorney-General is mild 
Che or she should also be in a position to determine strategies for the upholding of the 
constitution and sacrosanct human rights>, the distrust in the Prosecutor-General's office 
is clear. The Attorney-General shared the general feeling of his time that only the swapo 
government had the moral fibre and political will to implement a new dispensation of 
human rights vigorously. 
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The Prosecutor-General discussed the crundnorm from the 
perspective of the so-called Recntsstaat, representing tne notion of a 
state of justice. In a Recntsstaat certain fundamental principles are 
guaranteed, such as individual rights, equality before the law, the division 
of power of the state, the independence of the courts, the legality of the 
administration, a democratic form of government, and judicial review. 
<Henning and Badenhorst: 1994, p. 16>. 
The argument of the Prosecutor-General goes beyond what is 
practical or what model will fit the transitional Namibian society best. The 
issue goes far beyond a power struggle between two offices. For the 
Prosecutor-General the issue at stake is the fundamental values and norms 
of the Namibian people upon which the legal system of the new nation 
ought to be built. consequently, the question of constitutionality plays a 
vital part in its argument. 
In discussing the functions of the modern state, the Prosecutor-
General pointed out that the fundamental function of maintaining law 
and order is given to the Prosecutor-General in the constitution. <Ibid: p. 
25 f.) 
The Prosecutor-General gave great prominence to the doctrine of 
the separation of powers as one of the crundnorme of Namibian law. 
<Ibid: p. 34 ff.>. As one of the so-called 1982 constitutional Principles1, it is 
entrenched in the Namibian constitution. Wiechers <1990, p. Gf.> explains 
thatthe 1982 Principles constitute the conditions for Namibian statehood 
agreed upon by the international community and interested parties 
antecedent to the adoption of the constitution. By introducing these 
principles in its constitution, the constituent Assembly created a curb. 
The effect of this curb is that the Namibian legislature cannot amend or 
see wiechers: 1991 for a full discussion of the Principles and its history. The principles 
were proposed by the so-called western contact croup and later accepted by all parties 
as guidelines for a future Namibian constitution. 
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abolish any of the 1982 principles. 
tn constitutional terms, it means that the 1982 principles go 
beyond and deeper than the constitution itself: they 
constitute fundamental conditions upon which the existence 
and legal force of the constitution itself is founded. <Ibid: p. 7, 
quoted in Henning and Badenhorst: 1994, p. 36>. 
Arguing from the premise that the doctrine of separation of powers 
is important to the position of the Prosecutor-General vis-a-vis the 
Attorney-General, the Prosecutor-General concluded that this 
independence is part of the 1982 principles that goes even deeper than 
the constitution itself. <ibid: p.36> 
From this foundation, the Prosecutor-General's argument moved to 
Art. 78<3> of the constitution, stating that no member of Cabinet of 
Legislature or any other person shall interfere with judges or judicial 
officers in the exercise of their judicial functions, and all organs of the state 
shall accord such assistance as the courts may require to protect their 
independence, dignity and effectiveness, subject to the terms of this 
constitution or any other law. The Prosecutor-General quoted state versus 
Neita and Another 1992fSJ SA 785 NmHC on 7908, stating that the 
second leg of the article places a positive duty on the organs of the state 
to accord such assistance as the courts may require. <ibid: p.44> 
From Highstead Entertainment f PtyJ Ltd. t/a The Club' versus 
Minister ol Law and Order and Others 1994 f1J SA SB7 fCJ, the 
Prosecutor-General quoted the principle that the discretion to decide 
whether to prosecute or not is one of the fundamental functions of the 
Prosecutor-General in executing his duty to prosecute. The Prosecutor-
General concluded this section of his argument with a short sentence: 
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No political functionary can be allowed to interfere in this 
fundamental discretion. <ibid: p. 52) 
After an extensive research on the relationship between the 
prosecuting authority and the Attorney-General in commonwealth 
countries, the Prosecutor-General concluded correctly that the 
commonwealth does not provide a singe identity. Even legislation is not 
always helpful to understand the practices in differentjurisdictions, since 
practical conventions often exist which present a completely different 
picture. Lastly, the Prosecutor-General points out that several of these 
jurisdictions lack a supreme law similar to a constitution with an 
underlying crundnorm, and are therefore doubtful examples for Namibia. 
(ibid: p. 76). 
While the position of the Attorney-General that his supervision is 
necessary to ensure that human rights is respected and enforced, may 
have merit if one considers the past, the Prosecutor-General rejects it 
because it repeats the faults of the apartheid history the Attorney-General 
wished to change. 
Henning and Badenhorst <1994: p. 133> pointed to the irony that the 
Attorney-General relied upon section 3<5> of Act 51 of 1977, a section that 
was introduced in Namibia by a totalitarian regime which ruled by force 
and disregarded almost every accepted norm of constitutionalism. Even 
in south Africa, section 3C5) was repealed by the Attorney-General Act, Act 
92Of1992. 
The section, the Prosecutor-General argued, is not only a 
contradiction of the crundnorm of Namibian law, but one of the worst 
practices of the old regime and it is expressly rejected by the Namibian 
constitution, especially the Articles aimed at removing all vestiges of 
apartheid from society lArticles 23 <1> and 40<1>1. <ibid: p. 133>. 
But the position of the Attorney-General goes beyond being a 
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vestige of the old apartheid dispensation: Interference by the executive 
in the domain of the Prosecutor-General's independence is 
unconstitutional and, as was pointed out above, constitutes a violation of 
the content of fundamental underlying concepts such as Grundnorm, 
Rechtsstaat and constitutionalism. Clbid: 132> 
The Prosecutor-General concludes this section by stating that the 
Attorney-General fails to appreciate the true nature of his constitutional 
position. The fact that he reties on the worst practices of the south African 
regime, is a sad reflection on his constitutional appreciation and his value 
judgement. Clbid: p. 133 f.>. 
Finally, the Prosecutor-General points out that final responsibility 
must be read with Art. 87 <c>, obliging the Attorney-General to protect and 
uphold the constitution, and Art. 87 <b>, making the Attorney-General 
principal legal adviser of the President. Final responsibility can never be 
meant to strip the Prosecutor-General of his constitutional functions or 
powers. Clbid: p. 134 ff.> 
The Prosecutor-General adopted the stance that the real question 
that needs to be answered is: Is the Prosecutor-General truly independent 
under the constitution? <p.3>. The arguments of counsel for the 
Prosecutor-General were all attempts to point to the inherent philosophy 
and constitutional crundnorm underlying the constitutional 
independence of the Prosecutor-General. 
Against this approach stands the highly subjective <vet honest> ideal 
of the Attorney-General to transform society through specific and direct 
interventions in the prosecutorial process. The Attorney-General may have 
been correct in his view that onty intervention by the Executive through 
him could serve the constitution and especially the new values on human 
rights. Yet he makes the vital mistake to claim the same draconian powers 
of the old regime for the new government. 
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In doing so, the Attorney-General naively sanctified the new 
government. constitutionalism and the principle of a Recntsstaat, are, 
however based on a general mistrust in people. The corrupt world needs 
higher values, a Grundnorm that is not dependent upon good officials to 
maintain order and justice. The problem with the apartheid system was 
not that the officials who invented it were immoral people. The 
corruption lied in the Grundnorm cor absence thereof> in the basic values 
underlying the laws that were meant to ordain society. 
Fortunately for the Namibian people and the future of 
constitutionality in Namibia, the supreme court based its decision on the 
philosophical question of a Recntsstaat and a constitutional dispensation. 
8 THEJUDCMENT 
The supreme court per the Honourable Justice Leon only granted 
the third prayer of the Attorney-General, a point which was conceded by 
the counsel for the Prosecutor-General. The court observed with reference 
to Highstead Entertainment <Pty> Ltd t/a "The Club" versus Minister 
of Law and order and Others 1994 <1> SA 387 <C> at 393 H - 394 H, that 
one of the fundamental functions in the duty to prosecute is the 
discretion to proceed with a prosecution or to withdraw it. cp. 11>. 
After analysing the constitutional provisions of the offices in 
question, the court confirms the general notion that the Attorney-General 
is a political office with executive functions, while the Prosecutor-General 
is quasi-judicial and his appointment non-political. 
Moving to the issue of constitutionalism in general, the court quoted 
several of the post-independent judgments of the Namibian High court, 
state versus Acheson, supra, Mwandingi versusMinister of Defence, 
supra, covernment of Namibia versus cultura 2000, 1994 <1> SA 407 
and state versus van Wyk 1992 <1> SACR 147 to underline the emphasis 
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the court places on the broad interpretation of rights and the fact that 
the court sees the constitution as a radical break with apartheid and the 
old colonial order. 
The by then standard practice of the Namibian courts to deal with 
the constitution was followed by the court to weigh the other two 
contentions of the Attorney-General <i.e. that section 3 of the CPA still 
applies to Namibia and that the words 'final responsibility' also implies 
final authority>. The court quotes The state versus van wyk 1992 r1J 
SACR 147 fNmSCJ approvingly: 
I know of no other constitution in the world which seeks to 
identify a legal ethos against apartheid with greater vigour and 
intensity; 
and also The state versus Acheson 1991 f2J SA 805 rNmHCJ 
The constitution of a nation is not simply a statute which 
mechanically defines the structures of government and the 
governed. It is a 'mirror reflecting the national soul', the 
identification of the ideals and aspirations of a nation; the 
articulation of the values bonding its people and disciplining its 
government. The spirit and the tenor of the constitution must 
therefore preside and permeate the process of the judicial 
interpretation and judicial direction. 
The constitution is a mirror reflecting the national soul 
<Acheson, supra, p. 813>, it must be interpreted purposively to avoid 
the austerity of tabulated legalism <Mwandingi supra, p. 355>, it 
identifies a legal ethos against apartheid with greater vigour and 
intensity that any other constitution in the world ccultura, supra, p. 
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407 and van Wyk, supra p.173> and many of the south African laws 
were inconsistent with both the ethos and the express provisions of 
tne constitution and therefore unacceptable to the new Namibia 
ccultura, supra, p. 561>. 
In the light of the above and in the light of the fact that the 
Namibian constitution contains a declaration of Fundamental Human 
Rights that must be protected, the court makes the following 
observation: 
I do not believe that those rights and freedoms can be 
protected by allowing a political appointee to dictate wnat 
prosecutions may be initiated, which should be terminated 
or now they should be conducted. Nor do 1 believe that that 
would be in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of 
the Namibian people or in any way represent an articulation 
of its values. cp. 14>. 
After this general discussion of constitutionalism and even before 
looking at the specific points of the argument of the Attorney-General, 
the court made the following statement: 
I shall revert to this topic again, but wish merely to record at 
this stage that the above-mentioned view strikes at the neart 
of the reliance which the Attorney-General places on sec. 3(5J 
of tne south African criminal Procedure Act No 51of1977. cp.15> 
coming to the Attorney-General's reliance on the English and Welsh 
jurisdiction, the court shows that the final responsibility the Namibian 
Attorney-General exercises, is not synonymous with the superintendence 
of the British Attorney-General cpp. 12 and 18ffJ 
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The court found that the reliance of the Attorney-General on the 
practices in the united Kingdom and the commonwealth did not support 
his position. counsel for the Prosecutor-General has clearly pointed out 
that there is no common system in the commonwealth. <Henning & 
Badehorst: 1994, p. 56 ffJ In several cases the prosecuting authority, 
usually called the Director of Public Prosecutions, is independent of any 
political interference. 
Although the English/Welsh system is indeed unique in the rote that 
the political Attorney-General can play in theory, the court points out that 
in practice it has followed a path of independency for the Director of 
Public Prosecutions. The English and welsh courts have opted for a 
limitation of the powers of the Attorney-General over the years. The court 
quotes several British authorities to point out that the Director of Public 
Prosecutions is essentially an independent, non-political figure, rwhoseJ 
decisions are his own and not those of the Attorney-General. <ibid: p19 ffJ 
It concludes that it is unlikely that prayers m and cm of the Attorney-
General would succeed even in the united Kingdom today. cp. 19>. 
The court concludes that even if the Attorney-General is given 
statutory superintendence and direction over the office of the 
prosecuting authority, in practice he seldom if ever exercises any control 
over prosecutions. Thus, the Attorney-General cannot rely on his 
constitutional final responsibility to prove his point. 
If the interpretation of the phrase final responsibility does not 
help the Attorney-General, the court rightly concludes: 
unless section 3 rsJ of the criminal Procedure Act is applied,, 
the position of the Prosecutor-General is an a fortiori one in the 
sense that there is nothing in the constitution which expressly 
places his office under the general superintendence or 
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direction of the Attorney-General. <ibid: p. 19). 
The Attorney-General's reliance on the relationship between the 
Attorney-General and the prosecuting authority in commonwealth 
countries is discussed in detail by the court. <ibid: pp. 22 - 30>. The court 
concludes, there is no single pattern followed by all states. Further, the 
Namibian constitution used a different, unique language to express the 
relationship. Therefore the Attorney-General's argument cannot stand. 
While a constitutional observer like Prof. Edwards in his study of the 
relationship between the Attorney-General and Prosecutor-General in the 
commonwealth, was not sure whether the Namibian constitution gives the 
Attorney-General power to overrule the Prosecutor-General in the exercise 
of his powers, the court points out that Prof. Gerhard Erasmus, one of the 
drafters of the constitution, had no uncertainty. <ibid: p. 29>. 
He or she (Prosecutor-ceneral-jnhJ has a constitutionally 
prescribed post and is solely responsible for decisions 
concerning criminal prosecutions. Neither the Attorney-General 
and even less the Minister of Justice can give instructions to 
the Prosecutor-General. <Erasmus: 1990, 308> 
While the court clearly states that it does not suggest that the then 
Attorney-General acted in an oppressive matter, it warns against the 
dangers of a political prosecuting appointee. The court approvingly quotes 
Justice Ayooly stating that in Africa the prosecutorial power has often 
been used as a weapon to foster political ends. That ultimately leads to the 
destruction of democracy. <ibid: p.31, quoting Ayoola 1991: p1032 ff>. 
The court discussed the issue of a Rechtsstaat. The basic 
characteristic of the Rechtsstaat is that the state authority is bound by a 
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set of higher judicial norms ccrundzatzeJ, while it protects rights within 
this normative structure of the constitution. <ibid: p. 32 f.>. 
Namibia with its new constitution and its fundamental adherence to 
the Declaration of Human Rights complies with a modern Recntsstaat 
where state authority is bound by a set of higher juridical norms 
ccrundsatze> <ibid: p. 32 f.> In the same way the south African apartheid 
regime was not a Recntsstaat. <ibid>. 
The court refers to the Cultura 2ooocase where it was pointed out 
that many of the south African laws enacted by the south African 
Government during its administration were inconsistent with the ethos 
and provisions of the Namibian constitution. <ibid: p. 35 f.>. 
Therefore a mere reliance on Article 140 <1> - which keeps the laws 
in force immediately before independence intact in the new republic - is 
not enough. To be in force after independence, a law must also comply 
with the ethos and the provisions of the Namibian constitution. 
section 3<5> of the Criminal Procedure Act does not pass this test. It 
is not a product of a Rechtsstaat and is not compatible with the 
crundsatze relating to the separation of powers. <ibid: p. 37>. on the 
contrary, it is part of oppressive laws made applicable to the territory of 
south west Africa by the apartheid regime for its own political aims. 
The court also concludes that if the third prayer of the Attorney-
General is granted <namely to require that the Prosecutor-General keeps 
the Attorney-General informed in respect of all prosecutions initiated or 
to be initiated which might arouse public interest or involve important 
aspects of legal or prosecutorial policy>, there need not be a conflict 
between an independent Prosecutor-General and an Attorney-General that 
has final responsibility. Final responsibility then means more than financial 
responsibility, and includes his duty to account to the President, the 
Executive and the Legislature. <ibid: p.38 fl. 
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The court concludes that the Attorney-general cannot instruct the 
Prosecutor-General to institute a prosecution, to decline to prosecute or 
to terminate a pending prosecution in any matter. Neither can the 
Attorney-General instruct the Prosecutor-General to take on or to take any 
steps which the Attorney-General may deem desirable in connection with 
the preparation, institution or conduct of any prosecution. consequently, 
only the third prayer of the Attorney-General <the Attorney-general's right 
to require that the Prosecutor-General keeps him informed in respect of 
all sensitive prosecutions, was answered positively. 
9 THE ONCOINC ISSUE OF INDEPENDENCE: ARE THE EMPLOYEES IN THE 
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR-CENERAL PUBLIC SERVANTS? 
Although the decision of the supreme court on the independence 
of the Prosecutor-General removed the first uncertainty regarding the 
independence of the Prosecutor-General, it did not answer all the 
questions. Since the kind of independence that the Prosecutor-General 
enjoys, is in many ways unique in the world, there are not many 
authorities or examples to rely on. several issues remain unanswered. 
The Prosecutor-General does not have his own act in Namibia. Thus, 
the only sources of his functions at present are the constitution, the 
Criminal Procedure Act, and recent case law. 
It is generally accepted that the same rules that apply to Judges and 
the Ombudsman, are also applicable to the Prosecutor-General. The 
Prosecutor-General is appointed in the same manner as judges and the 
Ombudsman, and shares their salary scale and benefits. The Prosecutor-
General does not fall under the auspices of the Public service commission, 
but like Judges and the Ombudsman, under the Judicial service 
commission. 
However, whereas the constitution clearly provides for the 
retirement age, removal from office, etc. of the Judges and the 
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ombudsman, it is silent on the position of the Prosecutor-General. From 
the above it seems clear from both the constitution and the judgement 
of the court in EX Parte: Attornev-oeneral and Prosecutor-oeneral that 
the Prosecutor-General is not a public servant. This is also in line with his 
independence. 
However, even if the independence of the Prosecutor-General is 
clear, the same is not true of his staff. It is not clear whether section 4 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act is still valid in Namibia. Although the supreme 
court only dealt with section 3<5> of the Criminal Procedure Act, the 
present Prosecutor-General, Adv. J.L. Heyman, makes a case that the whole 
of sections 3 and 4 forms part of one corpus. <Prollius: 1998, p. 1>1 Since 
section 3<5> was declared unconstitutional by the supreme court because 
its Sitz im Leben lies in the old parliamentary order, and does not form 
part of the crundsatze of a Rechtsstaat, the same should apply to the rest 
of section 3 and all of section 4 of the Act. 
The functions of the Prosecutor-General are described as follows in 
Article 88 <2> of the constitution: 
1 
aJ to prosecute, subject to the provisions of this constitution, 
in the name of the Republic of Namibia in criminal proceedings; 
bJ to prosecute and defend appeals in criminal proceedings in 
the High court and the supreme court; 
CJ to perform all functions relating to the exercise of such 
powers; 
dJ to delegate to other officials, subject to his or her control 
and direction, authority to conduct criminal proceedings in any 
I The opinion of the Prosecutor-General is found in an unpublished opinion of a 
former staff member of the Office of the Prosecutor-General, Adv. s. Prollius, with 




eJ to perform all such other functions as may be assigned to 
him or her in terms of any other law. 
section 4 of the criminal Procedure Act reads as follows: 
4. Delegationl and local public prosecutor. -
An Attorney-General may in writing -
raJ delegate to any person, subject to the control and 
directions of the Attorney-General, authority to conduct 
on behalf of the state any prosecution in criminal 
proceedings in any court within the area of jurisdiction 
of such Attorney-General, or to prosecute in any court on 
behalf of the state any appeal arising from criminal 
proceedings within the area of jurisdiction of such 
Attorney-General; 
fbJ appoint any officer of the state as public prosecutor to 
any tower court within his area of jurisdiction who shall, 
as the representative of the Attorney-General and 
subject to his control and directions, institute and 
conduct on behalf of the state any prosecution in 
criminal proceedings in such tower court. 
The present Prosecutor-General, Adv. J.L. Heyman, sc, who is the first 
and only Namibian thus far to hold the position, holds the opinion that 
whereas sections 3 and 4 of the criminal Procedure Act ruled and regulated 
the actions of the prosecuting authority in Namibia before independence, 
Article 88 of the constitution repealed both sections <Prollius: 1998, 1> 
According to this interpretation, the ruling in Ex Parte Attorney-
oeneral In Re: The constitutional Relationship between the Attornev-
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ceneral and the Prosecutor-ceneral not only explicitly stated that the 
constitution repealed section 3 of the criminal Procedure Act, but one 
must also conclude that it implicitly included the rest of section 3 and 
section 4. 
Prollius refers to the American decision Gorham versus Luckett 
quoted in New Modderfontein Gold Mining company versus Transvaal 
Provincial Administration 1919 AD S67 at S97: 
And if this last Act professes, or manifestly intends, to regulate 
the whole subject to which it relates, it necessarily supercedes 
and repeals all former Acts, so far as it differs from them in 
prescriptions. The great object, then, is to ascertain the true 
interpretation of the last Act. That being ascertained, the 
necessary consequence is that the legislative intention thus 
deduced from it must prevail over any prior inconsistent 
intention to be deduced from a previous Act. 
Applying the principle to the issues at stake, the Prosecutor-General 
concludes that the discrepancies between sections 3 and 4 of the criminal 
Procedure Act and Article 88 of the constitution, makes it impossible for 
sections 3 and 4 to remain in force. <Prollius: 1998, p.2> 
section 4<a> gives the Prosecutor-General authority to delegate any 
person to conduct any prosecution, while section 4Cb> gives him/her 
authority to appoint any officer of the state as public prosecutor to any 
lower court to institute and conduct any state prosecution on his 
behalf. 
The Prosecutor-General maintains that section 4 ca> refers to the High 
court where the Prosecutor-General institute prosecutions in his/her own 
name. Those delegated to appear on his/her behalf only need to be 
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authorised to conduct proceedings. Since the Prosecutor-General cannot 
be physically present in the lower courts across the country, he/she has to 
delegate lower court prosecutors to institute and conduct prosecutions 
in terms of section 4 Cb>. 
Article 88 <2> <d> of the Namibian constitution, which authorises the 
Prosecutor-General to 'delegate other officials...... to conduct criminal 
proceedings in any court', repeals section 4<a>, but not 4Cb>, since it does 
not refer to the function of the lower court prosecutors to institute 
criminal proceedings. 
The authority of the Prosecutor-General to delegate persons to 
institute and conduct criminal proceedings in the lower courts, is 
according to this interpretation given by Article 88<2> <c>: " ... to perform all 
functions relating to the exercise of such powers .. ". This Article, according 
to the Prosecutor-General, has replaced section 4 <b> of the Criminal 
Procedure Act. Thus, Prollius <1998, p.3> makes the following observation 
concerning the appointment of public prosecutors: 
tt is important to understand that once a person is appointed 
as a public prosecutor by the Prosecutor-General, authority to 
institute and/or conduct criminal proceedings is immediately 
delegated to that specific public prosecutor, hence the 
principal that delegation of such authority is inherent in an 
appointment as public prosecutor . 
... once the f Prosecutor-cenera/J has appointed an officer of the 
state as public prosecutor, that officer becomes vested with 
the powers and duties appertaining to his post as public 
prosecutor in different statutory capacities. 
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Further, Prollius points out that if the Prosecutor-General is 
independent and if the appointment of public prosecutors is an essential 
function of the Prosecutor-General, it follows that public prosecutors and 
deputy prosecutors-general cannot be public servants. Thus, section 5 <1> 
the Public service Act 13of1995 giving the Prime Minister the authority to 
appoint, promote, transfer or discharge public servants on the 
recommendation of the Public service commission, does not apply to 
public prosecutors. <Prollius: 1998, p.4>. 
Since section 3C3> of the criminal Procedure Act gives the Minister of 
Justice <possibly the Attorney-General in Namibia> the authority to appoint 
deputy prosecutors-general, this section was also repealed by the 
constitution. 
If a 'political appointee cannot be allowed to dictate what 
prosecutions may be initiated, which should be terminated or 
now they should be conducted ... " rEX Parte Attorney-
oeneral, supra at p. 14J, now can tne appointment of those 
who prosecute under tne direction of the Prosecutor-General, 
by a political appointee be justified? rProllius: 1998, p. 4> 
Not every interested party agrees with the interpretation of the 
Prosecutor-General. If the Prosecutor-General is correct in his 
interpretation, the powers and functions that go with the duties of the 
Prosecutor-General, are all attributed to one person without any checks or 
balances. 
The interpretation of the Prosecutor-General is usually challenged on 
two points: 
1. The need for checks and balances; 
2. The explicit use of the word "official" in the constitution. 
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or. N. Tjiriange, who later became Minister of Justice, made the 
following comment on the Offices of the Prosecutor-General and Attorney-
General during the debates in the constituent Assembly on 31 January 
1990: 
The question of subordination comes in here. Traditionally 
under the system of commonwealth countries the 
prosecutor-general is within the Office of the Attorney-General 
for subordination reasons, but when he does his work, he is 
independent ............ . 
..... when it comes to his work to prosecute, he is 
absolutely independent, he does not get his instructions from 
the Attorney-General. But there must be a certain kind of 
subordination within the system. <Constituent Assembly 
Minutes: 1990, p. 153> 
The argument of the Minister did not carry much weight with the 
supreme court, as we have seen. However, there can be no doubt that 
unchecked power in the hands of one person is never the ideal. vet, in the 
absence of legislation to further regulate the functions and powers of the 
Office of the Prosecutor-General, it is not good enough to merely refer to 
a desirable situation. 
Should the issue be raised in the supreme court, It might opt for a 
different interpretation than the Prosecutor-General, based on the values 
of the constitution. we have already seen that the supreme court laid 
emphasis on the Grundnorme or core values entrenched in the 
constitution, among them the separation of power is one. The whole 
Philosophy of the separation of powers is based on the limitation of 
power. 
If the supreme court is convinced that a more legalistic 
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interpretation is needed to limit the extensive powers of the Prosecutor-
General, it might interpret the constitution in such a way that the 
Prosecutor-General is totally independent, but that his staff are public 
servants in terms of sections 3<3> and 4 of the criminal Procedure Act and 
that Ex Parte Attorney oeneral supra should be understood strictly in 
the sense that it only refers to the Prosecutor-General and not his staff 
and that it only ruled that the constitution repealed section 3<5> of the 
Criminal Procedure Act. 
This interpretation is strengthened by the second point above. 
According to Article 88 <2> <d> the Prosecutor-General delegates other 
oFFicials, subject to his or her control, direction and authority to conduct 
criminal proceedings in any court. 
There is a long history of using the word official as meaning a state 
official or civil servant. However, the only definition for official in the 
constitution is found in Chapter x: 
Chapter x The Ombudsman 
Article 93 [Meaning of "Official"J 
For the purposes of this chapter the word "official" shall, unless 
the context otherwise indicate, include any elected or 
appointed official or employee of any organ of the central or 
local Government, any official of a para-statal enterprise owned 
or managed or controlled by the state, or in which the state or 
the Government has substantial interest, or any officer of the 
defence force, the police force or the prison service, but shall 
not include a Judge of the supreme court or the High court or, 
in so far as a complaint concerns the performance of a judicial 
function, any other judicial officer. 
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Although Article 93 refers explicitly to Chapter x, dealing with the 
Ombudsman, it has persuasive value. It is a logical conclusion that in the 
absence of any definition for oFFicialin Article 88, the word has the same 
meaning as elsewhere in constitution. 
The exclusion of judges and any other judicial officer from the 
meaning of 'official' gives credence to an interpretation that the 
Prosecutor-General, like a judge, is considered to be independent of 
government, while his subordinates who are called officials in Article 88 <2> 
<d> do not have the same level of independence. 
If this interpretation is accepted, the constitution is on this point a 
continuation of the practices by the south African government under the 
Criminal Procedure Act of 1977. However, it does not explain why the 
constituent Assembly did not include the instituting of criminal 
proceedings, together with conducting criminal proceedings, under the 
functions of the officials delegated by the Prosecutor-General. 
If one argues, as the Prosecutor-General did, that Article 88 <2> of the 
constitution has fully replaced section 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act, it 
is still possible to have a situation where the Prosecutor-General is bound 
to have a position where his staff is appointed according to the rules and 
norms of section 5 <1> of the Public service Act 13of1995. This should then 
probably form part of the final responsibility of the Attorney-General. 
However, until the Office of the Prosecutor-General is regulated by 
legislation, the position of sections 3 and 4 rwith the exception of section 
3 <5> J of the Criminal Procedure Act will remain unclear. 
Despite the practical shortcomings in the view that Article 88 of the 
Namibian constitution has repealed sections 3 and 4 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, it is the most acceptable interpretation. The spirit of the 
Namibian constitution, as ably interpreted by the honourable Justice Leon 
in Ex Parte Attorney-ceneral in re The constitutional Relationship 
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Between The Attorney-ceneral And The Prosecutor-ceneral supra, is 
against political intervention in the prosecuting endeavours of the 
country. 
The problems that might arise out of the uncontrolled and untested 
authority and power of the Prosecutor-General can be encountered by 
legislation. such legislation can provide for a committee consisting of the 
Prosecutor-General and his/her senior deputies to handle appointments, 
transfers, promotion and other administrative issues, with the Prosecutor-
General and all his deputies being a body of appeal. The legislation should 
also confirm the independence of all prosecutors, with legal protection of 
their term of office, their salaries, etc. to warrant their independence. 
Presently in practice it is not even the Attorney-General, but the 
Minister of Justice or the Permanent secretary for Justice, who performs 
this role. 1 
Junior prosecutors are interviewed and recommended by the 
Prosecutor-General but appointed by the Permanent secretary. 
In the case of senior managerial staff, the Prosecutor-General usually 
sets up an interview team in accordance with the Public service Act. 
Although the committee makes a recommendation, the appointment is 
made by the Public service commission and approved by the Office of the 
Prime Minister. 
The Prosecutor-General is nevertheless left with the authority to 
delegate the official to prosecute. There is no indication in the 
constitution or any other law, that anyone but the Prosecutor-General can 
me Permanent secretary for Justice is the administrative officer of both the Minister of 
Justice and the Office of the Attorney-General. in practice, however, he has limited 
contact with the Attorney-General. A case in point of their limited contact is the conflict 
between Namibia and Botswana over the ownership of the Kasikili islands in the caprivi. 
The case went to the international court of Justice. Yet although the Attorney-General 
is the chief legal adviser of government, and has the Namibian expert on borders on his 
staff, the Permanent secretary handled the case without consultation with the Attorney-
General. 
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delegate anyone to prosecute. Thus, if the Prosecutor-General refuses to 
delegate an appointee of the Ministry of Justice or the Public service 
commission, the Ministry will find itself with power that it cannot use. 
The same argument applies to prosecutors, who are strictly speaking, 
employed by the Ministry of Justice <not the Attorney-General as one 
would expect>. If such a prosecutor, working under the control, direction 
and authority of the Prosecutor-General, calls on his/her employer in a 
dispute with the Prosecutor-General, the employer remains powerless. If 
the employee complains against a transfer, and the Ministry intervenes, 
the station of the prosecutor may be stuck with an official with no 
delegation. 
The way forward, it seems will only be smooth if the Office of the 
Prosecutor-General is regulated by the necessary legislation. 
10 A BRIEF COMPARISON BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND NAMIBIA 
While Article 179 of the south African constitution of 1996 creates an 
independent prosecuting authority, there are also severe shortcomings. 
The National Director of Public Prosecutions is an executive appointment 
by the President as head of the national executive. [Art. 179 <1> <b> J Thus, 
unlike Namibia, he is a political appointee. 
According to Art. 179 <6> the cabinet member responsible for the 
administration of justice must exercise final responsibility over the 
prosecuting authority. Whether final responsibility will be interpreted to 
have the same restrictive meaning in south Africa as it has in Namibia since 
the historic case between the Attorney-General and the Prosecutor-
General, remains to be seen. The Namibian interpretation will undoubtedly 
have convincing power in south Africa. 
It does seem, however, as if the south African courts will be less 
inclined to follow the radical Namibian model. When the constitutional 
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court certified the south African constitution, the court rejected the 
complaint that the National Director of Prosecutions is appointed by the 
President. The court, unlike the Namibian supreme court, did not see it as 
a threat to separation of powers, since the prosecuting authority is not 
part of the judiciary. Ex Parte Chairperson oF the constitutional 
Assembly: in re certiFication oF the constitution oF the Republic oF 
south AFrical 1996 f4J SA 744 rccJ on p. 818 
The prosecuting authority is not part of the Judiciary and CP 
VI has no application to it. tn any event, even if it were part of 
the Judiciary, the mere fact that the appointment of the head 
of the national prosecuting authority is made by the President 
does not in itself contravene the doctrine of separation of 
powers. <Ibid.: p. 818> 
The Deputy National Directors and Directors <the former Attorney-
Generals> of Prosecutions are also appointed by the President, albeit after 
consultation with the Minister and National Director. csection11 <1> and 13 
<1 > of the National Prosecuting Authority Act, Act 32 of 1998>. 
consultation is a much weaker word than the Namibian recommendation. 
Further, the consultation is with the Minister, who is part of the executive, 
and the National Director, who is an executive appointee. Thus in terms 
of the reasoning of the Namibian supreme court, the Deputy Directors are 
also political rather than quasi-legal appointments. 
However, the power of the National Director is much less than that 
of his/her Namibian counterpart and there are also more checks and 
balances built into the system. The traditional independence of the 
directors will make it difficult for the National Director to interfere with 
their decisions, although he/she has the constitutional power to do so lArt. 
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179 (5) (d)]. 
Further, the National Director is bound to a ten year non-renewable 
term [Section 12<1> of Act 32 of 19981. The roles of the National Deputy 
Directors, Directors and Deputy-Directors are clearly spelled out in chapter 
4 of the Act and special provision is made when the National Director is not 
available [Section 11 <2> <b> of Act 32of19981. 
Thus, while the south African constitution does not give its 
prosecuting authority the same independence as Namibia, the Namibian 
Attorney-General and the Law Reform commission can address many of the 
present uncertainties and weaknesses of the Namibian prosecuting process 
by studying Act 32 of 1998. 
11 CONCLUSION 
The level of independence enjoyed by the Namibian Prosecutor-
General is unique in Africa, and even in the world. 
A glimpse into the organisation of prosecuting authorities in the 
commonwealth, reveals extensive intervention by political appointees in 
criminal proceedings. <The commonwealth Legal Advisory service: 1992; 
Edwards: 1977>. 
The commonwealth Legal Advisory service <1992, p. 1> points out that 
even in England and wales, where the Director of Public Prosecutions is 
independent in his day to day operations, he remains subject to the 
direction of the Attorney-General. The latter also has enormous quasi-
judicial powers and a discretion to initiate, take over or terminate 
prosecutions. UbidJ 
Edwards <1977: p. 202 ffJ comments that he was surprised to find out 
that the issue of nolle prosequi certificates, assigned to the Australian 
Attorney-General, was for many years controlled by Cabinet. He also 
learned that in New Zealand cabinet discuss the initiation and extent of 
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criminal prosecutions. 
Despite the shortcomings of the Namibian legislation, Article 88 of 
the Namibian constitution gave the country a truly independent 
prosecuting authority that has the constitutional power and authority to 
withstand political pressure and intimidation. 
The danger of uncontrolled and unchecked power in the hands of 
one person needs to be addressed in the near future with legislation 
ordering and organising the Office of the Prosecutor-General. 
12 EPILOGUE 
constitutionalism is not only about interpretation or the ordering of 
society. It is also about power. Zimbabwe has changed its constitution 
fifteen times before it was decided to finally replace it to get rid of the 
unwanted Lancaster House clause requiring compensation for confiscated 
land.CUN Integrated Regional Information Network: sept. 1999>. The 
proposed new constitution places the onus on the former colonial power 
to pay compensation to white farmers whose land is confiscated by 
government. CUN Integrated Regional Information Network: 2 Feb. 2000> The 
surprised victory of the No-vote in the Zimbabwean constitutional 
referendum will at least put the present new constitution on hold. 
Nevertheless, the sentiments of the protagonists for a new 
constitution in Zimbabwe, are winning ground in Namibia. The constitution 
expresses the will of the people and should be changed if it does not. It 
falls outside the objectives of this paper to discuss the validity of this 
point. Suffice it to say that after the overwhelming victory of swapo in the 
presidential and general elections in November 1999, the pressure is already 
building up to change the constitution again - it was changed in 1999 to 
give the present President a third term. CA. Du Pisani:2000> 
The argument, often used in Zimbabwe, that those articles of the 
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constitution that were introduced by the western contact Group must be 
seen as foreign interpolations, is also echoed on radio and television talk 
shows in Namibia. Thus, while constitutional authorities see the 
constitutional Principles, including the independence of the Prosecutor-
General, as a curb in the constitution that cannot be amended, popular 
opinions in newspapers and on the radio chat shows express a different 
perception. 
The extensive powers of the Prosecutor-General has also come under 
fire in the months running up to and directly after the general elections. 
The Lawyers Association of Namibia has complained about the fact that 
only white males attended the Annual conference of the International 
Association of Prosecutors CL Du Pisani: 1999>, as well as the racial 
composition of newly appointed Deputy-Prosecutor-Generals. 
In the absence of an act stipulating clear guidelines, the Prosecutor-
General has relied on the constitution to develop precedents that give him 
almost unchecked powers, not only in his prosecutorial duties, but also in 
staff and administrative matters. 
When the third Parliament of Namibia is sworn in on 22 March 2000 
and the third government takes power, one can expect that the office of 
the Prosecutor-General will be on their list of priorities. 
The first Attorney-General, Mr. Harmut Ruppel, failed to get the 
Prosecutor-General under his political and administrative authority. The 
second Attorney-General, Adv. verkuii Rukoro, entered Parliament as 
member of a small opposition party. He supported the philosophy of an 
independent Prosecutor-General and had a good relationship with his 
office. His name did not appear on the party list for the 1999 elections. 
Indications are that the third Attorney-General will be a party loyalist. 
Only time will tell if he/she will take the road of constitutional amendments 
or another act of Parliament to address the unsettled issues of Ex Parte 
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Attorney-General: In re The constitutional Relationship Between The 
Attorney-General And The Prosecutor-General. 
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